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1 Introduction
The behaviour of rms is sometimes glossed over in the analysis of economic
analysis of tax policy. In the analysis of tax compliance it is often omit-
ted altogether. This omission is rather odd: tax inspectors typically use
background knowledge about markets and industries in order to rene the
monitoring and auditing process and, even if this knowledge is exercised in
rule-of-thumb fashion, one would expect it to be in conformity with rational
economic principles. Of course, rms do make an appearance in the stand-
ard compliance literature, but only in a rather specialised manner and in
connection with rather specialised questions. In this paper we take a step
toward a richer analysis by focusing on corporate tax-evasion and market
decisions in an oligopolistic setting. We examine the impact of alternative
audit rules on receipts from a tax on prots, allowing for both compliance
responses and output or price responses by the rms. Why does this altern-
ative focus make such a di¤erence to the analysis?
Most models in the literature focus on a simple proportionate audit rule
in an adapted version of the Allingham and Sandmo (1972) model, as though
rms habitually play the dual roles of producers and gamblers. In nearly
all the standard models of corporate compliance there is a fundamental
separation result between the production and concealment activities. This
conclusion appears to be robust to alternative assumptions about market
structure and the specications of rmsobjectives.
However, taxes are not neutral in a setting where the behaviour of the
tax authority depends on all the declarations in a particular market. The
tax authority can exploit this market-based information and so, in the light
of this, we investigate the implications of using a more intelligent audit rule
that is easily implementable. The idea is that a change in audit rule will
introduce a regime where tax enforcement can inuence output decisions.
By conditioning an individual audit on the declaration of all rms the au-
thority creates an externality. The externality can be seen as generating two
dividends: (a) less tax evasion (b) an e¢ ciency improvement. The reduction
in tax evasion is a direct result of the tax authoritys making better use of
available information from the collection of rms. The move toward static
e¢ ciency arises because of an induced increase in output generated by the
switch in enforcement regime.
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the story of corpor-
ate tax compliance as conventionally presented in the literature and outlines
the model presented here; section 3 examines the equilibrium behaviour of
rms in the two main dimensions and sections 4 to 6 present the main res-
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ults, while Section 7 provides an example illustrating the results. Section 8
concludes.
2 The setting and model outline
2.1 Background
The literature on models of corporate tax compliance usually focuses on
one of two relatively simple market structures competitive price taking or
monopoly. The elements of such a model are simple: a risk-neutral price-
taking rm with constant marginal costs and a determinate demand curve
faces a proportionate prots tax The sole source of uncertainty is created
by a combination of the rms actions (the rm can conceal prot, but at
a cost) and the governments tax audit (a given audit probability with a
known penalty proportionate to the amount concealed). The rm conceals
up to the point where the marginal cost of concealment equals the marginal
reduction of expected tax rate, a rule that is independent of the rms output
level (Cowell 2004).
The advantage of this approach is its simplied behavioural analysis of
the tax-evading rm: the production department can get on with de-
termining the level of output in the light of market conditions; the tax-
management department separately decides on matters of prot declara-
tion. But there are several three causes for concern:
 The separability result is clearly articial and it is not clear that it
would survive in a more interesting model of the industry.
 The type of audit rule used is naive in that it does not make use of
low-cost or costless information that would be available to the tax-
authority from the rmsreports.
 The argument that taxation policy has no e¤ect on output seems
inappropriate in the light of the perception that corporate taxation
does have an e¤ect on rms activities. Of course this perception
may be misplaced, but it would be useful to know whether there is
a good theoretical case for considering a real e¤ect of taxation and
tax-enforcement policy.
To address these questions we develop a simple model that will permit
a somewhat richer version of market structure and behaviour by the tax
authority. The model consists of a conventional story of individual rms, an
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industry with a given number of rms, a simple tax function and an audit
rule. We will briey examine each of these in turn.
2.2 The industry
We focus on an oligopolistic market with a xed number of rms producing
a single homogeneous output. The rms compete in a standard model of
market interaction: we will consider both quantity-competition (Cournot)
and price-competition (Bertrand) versions of the model. Each rm has a
simple production technology, the details of which are subsumed within a
conventional prot function. It faces a requirement to pay tax and knows
that it has opportunities for evasion. This enables us to focus on perhaps
the most appealing and relatively uncomplicated case of strategic interde-
pendence amongst rms in order to examine the potential role of taxation
policy in a market form that is not purely mechanistic. One consequence
of this is that, in the context of quantity competition, we would expect the
standard Cournot-Nash equilibrium to emerge in which output is above the
level corresponding to joint-prot maximisation but below that character-
ising economic e¢ ciency. In what follows we describe the environment for
rms competing in quantities. The case of price competition can be obtained
by exchanging qi (quantity produced by rm i) for pi (price set by rm i)
as arguments of the gross prot functions.
2.3 Taxation and prots
Let us set out the role of the tax system in the objective function for the
rms. Formally there is a population N := f1; :::; ng of rms where N is
exogenous. Firm i makes gross prot gi (q) where
q : = (q1; q2; :::; qi; :::qn)
is the vector of quantities produced. Each rm has to declare prots. The
declaration of rm i is denoted by di and the vector of declarations is written
d : = (d1; d2; :::; di; :::; dn):
Rather than limiting itself to treating each di in isolation the tax authority
can base an audit rule on the information provided by the collection of
declarations d. This crucial point is developed in section 2.6.
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We assume a linear prots tax and a ne for detected tax evasion, that
is proportional to the concealed prot.1 There is no loss-o¤set or compens-
ation: subsidies are not given for losses, nor are bonuses paid for revealed
over-compliance. So the legal tax liability is dened as
T legi = tmax[0; 
g
i (q)]
where t is the tax rate. The tax payable depending on the prot declaration
if no audit takes place is
T payi = max[0; tdi]:
So the prot net of taxes if no audit takes place can be written as:
i(di;q) :=

gi (q)  tdi if di  0
gi (q) otherwise
(1)
After an audit, if a rm is found to have underpaid tax it is required to
make up the shortfall and also to pay a ne F :
i(di;q) := 
g
i (q)  tmax[0; gi (q)]  F (gi (q); di) (2)
We assume a ne proportional to undeclared prot. With the propor-
tionality factor f the ne becomes:
F (gi (q); di) :=

f [gi (q)  di] if di < gi (q)
0 otherwise
2.4 Concealment cost
E¤ective concealment requires that the rm incur a real resource cost.2 We
do not assume a specic functional form for this. However, it seems reas-
onable to assume that the concealment cost rises with the prot concealed.
Additionally, we assume that the marginal concealment cost are also increas-
ing in the prot concealed. For declarations which are not higher than the
actual prot (di  gi ) we have
C(gi   di)  0;
C 0 > 0;
C 00 > 0:
1Note that the way the ne is dened may play a crucial role for the e¤ect changes in
the tax rate have on declaration behaviour. For the purposes of our paper, which focuses
on the analysis of the impact of a relative audit rule, the formulation of the ne is not
crucial.
2These cost e.g. could stem from buying in specialist advise, reorganizing transaction
paterns or purchasing avoidance schemes.
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where primes denote derivatives. We further assume that there are no be-
nets for over-reporting and that concealment cost are zero for truthful
declarations:
C(gi   di) = 0 for di > gi ;
C(0) = 0:
2.5 Objective function
For expositional reasons, we assume the managers of the rm to be risk-
neutral. Our analysis does not crucially depend on the risk preferences
assumed.3 Let us denote the audit probability for rm i, which is determined
by the tax authority, as (i;d):4 The audit probability for rm i may or may
not depend on the vector of all declarations in the industry. If it does depend
on d in a certain way we will speak of a relative audit rule (see section 2.6
for details). If the audit probability is xed and does not depend on either
the declaration of the rm in question or the declarations of the other rms
in the industry then we speak of a xed audit rule.
Given a relative audit rule we can write the objective function of the
rm as its expected payo¤:
E(i(d;q)) := (i;d)i(di;q) + [1  (i;d)]i(di;q)  C(gi (q); di) (3)
The appropriate objective function under the xed audit rule can be found
by replacing the expression (i;d) by a given number fix 2 (0; 1) in Equa-
tion (3).
2.6 Audit rule
Suppose the authority assigns the audit probability (i;d) to rm i where
the individual audit probability is conditional on d. Then we can use the
following denition:
3 In contrast to a large body of literature we does not analyze the impact of tax rates
on evasion where risk preferences and ne functions are crucial for the results.
4 In what follows we will use the term audit probability. This implies that the authority
conducts randum full-scale audits, which perfectly reveal evasion. However, in reality
authorities audit large rms every year. Due to the complexity these audits are only
partial and do not reveal the true prot with certainty. Under such a scenario i can be
seen as the detection probability, which can be increased by the authority by increasing
the audit e¤ort.
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Denition 1 A relative audit rule is a function  : N  Rn 7! [0; 1] that
satises the following conditions:
@ (i;d)
@di
 0 8i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng (D1)
@ (i;d)
@dj
 0 8j 6= i 2 f1; 2; :::; ng (D2)
nX
i=1
@ (i;d)
@dj
= 0 8j 2 f1; 2; :::; ng (D3)
The rst property (D1) takes into account that ceteris paribus a higher
prot declaration should lead to a lower audit probability. Lower declar-
ations make the authority more suspicious and induce higher audit prob-
abilities. Condition D2 captures the relative nature of the audit rule: if a
competitor increases its declaration then this increases is probability of be-
ing audited. The rationale behind this property is that the observation of a
high declaration of one rm makes the authority believe that the prot situ-
ation in the industry was good for the scal year in question. Then it should
shift its attention to the rms with comparatively low declarations, such as
i, because it becomes more likely that those rms have under-reported their
prots.
Put di¤erently, an authority that does not know the prot situation
in an industry on the one hand and that on the other hand believes that
prots in an industry are correlated, should put a higher probability of tax
evasion on a received declaration if the declarations of other rms increase.
This strategy corresponds to an implicit model of industry prots that con-
tains an industry-specic common shock component the authority cannot
observe. However, observing the level of declarations the authority can draw
inferences on this common shock component.
So di¤erences in declarations indicate rm-specic unobserved shocks
and/or tax evasion. A higher prot declaration of one rm renders tax
evasion of the others more likely for their given declarations.
The third part of the denition (D3) captures the widely applied practice
of tax authorities to assign a certain amount of resources to an industry.5
Technically (D3) keeps the expected number of audits in an industry con-
stant.
5This is done implicitly in countries like the United States or Germany while in other
countries (e.g. Australia) the targeted industries are made public.
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3 Equilibrium
In this section we outline the optimisation problem of the rms. We focus
on quantity competition under a relative audit rule. Bertrand competition
is obtained by changing the choice variable in the competition stage. For a
xed audit rule we just set the partial derivatives of the detection probability
with respect to the declaration of any rm to zero.
3.1 Information and timing
Let us focus on quantity competition in the rst instance. We can imagine
the following simple sequence of decisions and actions.
0 Firms learn the tax and ne system and the audit rule that is in place
for the coming tax year.
1 Firms choose quantities.
2 Firms observe the gross prots of all market participants and then
choose their prot declarations.
It is the interaction of rms in stages one and two that makes the prob-
lem particularly interesting. Implicitly, we assume that the rms have an
information advantage over the authority. Firms are better informed about
the level of prots within an industry than the tax authority; this gives the
relative audit rule bite.This situation could be applicable in an industry
with stochastic demand shocks, for example: a rm can infer from its own
prot what the equilibrium prots of the other rms must look like. In
standard models the extreme assumption is made that rms have no in-
formation advantage over the tax authority at all; for simplicity we take the
opposite extreme where rms know the prots in the industry, while the
authority does not.6
3.2 The declaration stage
We begin with the stage where rms make the declaration to the tax author-
ity. The rms will treat the gross prots as given when they decide about
their declarations. First of all, note that there is no incentive for a rm
6An intermediate model where rms obtain a more accurate signal about the level of
prots in the industry than the tax authority seems to be most realistic. We chose the
extreme case model for two reasons: (a) tractability and (b) the basic intuition of an
externality imposed by a relative audit rule is not obscured by the signal sturcture.
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to declare more than the prot actually made, since no reward is given for
over-compliance. Additionally, it is clear that the optimal declaration for
a rm which incurs losses is to report truthfully. This is the case, because
declaring a higher loss than actually su¤ered does not lead to any subsidies,
but concealment cost and potentially nes have to be paid. We now turn to
the situation where tax evasion is optimal. Assume a positive gross prot
(gi > 0). Then the rst-order condition for an interior solution is given by:
@Ei
@di
:=
@(i;d)
@di
[i   i] + 

@i
@di
  @i
@di

+
@i
@di
  @Ci
@di
= 0 (4)
The second-order condition is:
@2Ei
@d2i
:=
@2(i;d)
@d2i
[i   i] + 2
@(i;d)
@di

@i
@di
  @i
@di

  @
2Ci
@d2i
< 0
Note that i i  0, @(i;d)=@di < 0; @i=@di @i=@di = f + t > 0; and
@2Ci=@d
2
i > 0: Therefore a su¢ cient condition for the second-order condition
to be satised is
@2(i;d)
@d2i
 0 (D4)
To simplify matters we only consider audit rules that satisfy (D4).
Given positive prots and the global concavity of the objective func-
tion in rm is own declaration we can establish conditions for an interior
solution. There is an interior solution whenever
@Ei
@di

di=0
> 0 > lim
di!gi
@Ei
@di
Inspection shows that an interior solution is likely whenever
a. marginal concealment costs are high for extensive tax evasion, which
prevents zero-declarations, and
b. a generally low level of detection probabilities and a low marginal
evasion-cost for the rst unit of prot concealed exist, which gives
incentives for evasion.
However, because of the endogeneity of the detection probability, there
is no general condition which depends only on parameters that will ensure
an internal solution.
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3.3 The market-response stage
Now consider the stage that determines the rmsprots: depending on the
assumptions made about the nature of competition in the market each rm
makes a decision about output or price. Clearly the standard issue of the
existence of an equilibrium in pure strategies will arise. Assuming that the
strategy space is compact and non-empty and that the objective functions
are continuous and strictly quasi-concave in the choice variable ensures a
unique equilibrium in pure strategies  see Fudenberg and Tirole (1991),
p.34. To avoid complications we assume for now that these conditions to
hold.7 The assumption of uniqueness is dropped in the next section.
Take a market where rms compete in quantities the case of compet-
ition on price is analysed below. Then the rst-order condition for optimal
output given that rms will le (and expect the competitors to le) an op-
timal tax return for any possible prot distribution can be written as:
@Ei
@qi
:=
@(i;d)
@qi
[i   i] + (i;d)

@i
@qi
  @

i
@qi

+
@i
@qi
  @C

i
@qi
= 0 (5)
The asterisks indicate that the changes of the optimal declaration (of all
rms) due to change in the quantity supplied have to be taken into account.
Note that the change in the equilibrium audit-probability @(i;d)=@qi in-
cludes the e¤ects of declaration changes of all rms due to the change in
observed prots. Solving the rst-order condition for the declaration (4) for
C 0 and substituting in the rst-order condition from above gives:
nX
j 6=1
@(i;d)
@dj
@dj
@qi
[i   i] +
@gi
@qi

1  t+ t(i;d) + [i   i]
@(i;d)
@di

= 0
(6)
The set of rst-order conditions, one for each rm, characterises the
equilibrium. Using this characterisation of equilibrium we can now present
the main results in three steps: sections 4 to 6.
4 Compliance decisions
In this section we compare the di¤erent e¤ects xed and relative audit rules
have on the extent of tax evasion. We nd that a relative audit rule leads to
7A compact strategy set results from restricting the feasible quantities to qi 2 [0; qmax]
8i; where qmax is the biggest production quantity that is physically feasible. The ob-
jective functions are obviously continuous. Quasi-concavity can be achieved by choosing
appropriate demand, cost and detection- probability functions.
9
less tax evasion than a comparable xed audit rule if the declaration stage
has an interior solution. The result derived is not dependent on whether
rms compete in quantities or prices.
The intuition for the result is rather simple: in addition to the typical
incentives provided by a xed detection probability and the corresponding
ne, a relative audit rule provides a further incentive to increase the declar-
ation, as this decreases the detection probability. Suppose we have a xed
detection probability fix then the rst-order condition of an individual rm
in the declaration stage becomes:
@Efixi
@di
:= fix

@i
@di
  @i
@di

+
@i
@di
  @Ci
@di
= 0 (7)
Recall that the rst-order condition under a relative audit rule is given by
@Ei
@di
:=
@(i;d)
@di
[i   i] + 

@i
@di
  @i
@di

+
@i
@di
  @Ci
@di
= 0:
In order to compare the two rules we need a criterion that makes the two
regimes comparable. Hence we require the equilibrium detection probability
in the relative-rule scenario to be equal to the xed detection probability.
This ensures that the audit costs incurred by the authority are equal under
both regimes. Setting  = fix and keeping the prots the same in both
cases implies that the two rst-order conditions only di¤er by the term
@(i;d)
@di
[i   i]:
This is just the additional incentive to increase the declaration in order to
reduce the detection probability, which leads to higher declarations under a
relative audit rule.
Proposition 1 In an interior declaration equilibrium a relative audit rule
leads to less evasion than a xed rule with the same detection probability.
Proof. Pick an interior di 2 (0;i) such that for a given  = fix
condition (7) holds. Then under the xed audit rule the declaration is
optimal. For this di the marginal expected prot of declaring an additional
dollar under a xed rule is
@(i;d)
@di
[i   i];
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which is positive for an interior solution as @(i;d)=@di < 0; i   i < 0:
Assumption (D4) ensures global concavity of Ei in di; which implies the
claimed property.
So, in a situation where there is competition among the few, switching
to a more intelligent audit rule yields an immediate dividend less evasion.
5 Output decisions
However, there is more that can be said on behalf of the relative audit rule.
As we noted earlier (section 2.1), in simple competitive and noncompetitive
models the tax-enforcement parameters do not distort output although this
result depends on the way in which the audit probability and penalty rate
are formulated (Lee 1998). So too in our model: it is clear that there is no
e¤ect on output if audit probabilities are independent of the declarations.
In what follows we will show that for typical Cournot games with unique
equilibria in pure strategies a switch to relative auditing will increase ag-
gregate quantity and thus e¢ ciency. We exclude underlying Cournot games
with multiple equilibria in order to have a denite reference for our compar-
ative statics analysis.8 Suppose we have a smooth Cournot oligopoly with
a compact strategy space where inverse demand p(Q) is decreasing and log-
concave in Q: Furthermore assume that production costs K are such that
K 00i (qi) p0(Q) > 0 for all rms. Note that this does not exclude asymmetry
with regard to the cost functions. The conditions above are well-known to
be su¢ cient for N-player Cournot games to have a unique Nash equilib-
rium in pure strategies.9 In what follows we refer to oligopolies as regular if
they satisfy these conditions. In a such regular oligopolies the best response
functions of rms have non-positive slopes larger than  1:
dqi
dQ i
=   @
2i
@qi@Q i
=
@2i
@q2i
=   p
0 + p00qi
2p0 + p00qi  K 00i
>  1: (8)
We rst establish that the best-response quantity of an individual rm
under relative auditing is larger than under a xed audit rule. As mentioned
above under a xed audit rule the quantity decision is equivalent to the
decision in an oligopoly without taxation and tax enforcement.
8Note that we do not exclude games where the resulting Cournot game with relative
auditing has multiple equilibria (potentially in mixed strategies) as long as the underlying
Cournot game has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies.
9See Vives (1999), Theorems 2.7 and 2.8.
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Proposition 2 Under an independent audit rule output is independent of
the evasion decision and equals the Cournot quantities.
Proof. In the declaration stage the rst-order condition for an inde-
pendent audit rule is identical to the one under a relative audit rule from
(4). The only di¤erence is that the rst-order conditions of di¤erent rms
are not linked through  and @(i;d)=@di . The rst-order condition on the
output stage is also very similar to the corresponding condition under a re-
lative audit rule (5). The only di¤erence here is that @(i; di)=@qi does not
contain any indirect inuences via changes in the competitors declarations
due to a changed output.10 Substituting the rst-order condition for declar-
ation into the rst-order condition for output choices gives the condition
@gi
@qi

1  t+ t (i; di) + [i   i]
@(i; di)
@di

= 0
which only holds if @gi =@qi = 0: This implies that the oligopolists choose
the Cournot quantity.
We now turn to relative auditing. Denote the best response of rm i
in the regular Cournot game as BRCi (q i), while BR
R
i (q i) gives the best
response correspondence under a relative audit rule.
Lemma 3 Assume that the market organisation has the form of a regular
Cournot oligopoly. Then
BRRi (q i) > BR
C
i (q i)
wherever BRCi (q i) > 0.
Proof. Take the rst-order condition for the quantity choices from (6):
nX
j 6=i
@ (i;d)
@dj
@dj
@qi
[i   i]| {z } +
@gi
@qi|{z}

1  t+ t (i;d) + [i   i]
@ (i;d)
@di

| {z } = 0
(a) (b) (c)
Note that term (c) is positive, since 1  t+ t (i;d) > 0, i   i  0, and
@ (i;d) =@di  0. So the sign for (b) has to be the opposite of term (a);
and if (a) is zero then (b) has to be zero as well. Recall that @gi =@qi = 0 is
the rst-order condition for optimal output in a Cournot oligopoly. So for
10For the totally xed audit rule analysed above this derivative vanishes entirely.
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a higher output, which is closer to the socially e¢ cient output @gi =@qi < 0
has to hold. This implies that (a) needs to be positive for our claim to be
true. As i   i < 0 and @ (i;d) =@dj > 0 for any interior solution, the
crucial question is whether @dj=@qi < 0 holds. The declaration of rm j will
be inuenced by a change of qi through two di¤erent channels: the change in
the own prot and the reactions of other rms due to their changed prots.
Using the implicit function theorem we can write rm js subgame perfect
reaction to rm i changing its quantity as:
@dj
@gj
@gj
@qi
=   1


C 00   (f + t) @
 (j;d)
@dj

@gj
@qi
where
 :=
@2Ej
@d2j
: (9)
The whole term is negative if  < 0; C 00 > 0, @(j;d)=@dj < 0; and
@gj=@qi < 0. If so, then (a) is negative, as all competitors have qualitatively
identical rst-order e¤ects. This shows that the optimal quantity (or all
optimal quantities if BRRi (q i) is a correspondence rather than a function)
is higher than the best response under Cournot for the same output vector
of the other rms:
BRRi (q i) > BR
C
i (q i) 8i;q i (10)
This result is su¢ cient to ensure that the aggregate quantity under a
relative auditing rule is larger if a) the oligopoly is regular and symmetric
and b) the equilibrium under relative auditing is also symmetric. However,
by using some properties of a regular oligopoly we can generalise this result
considerably. Denote the aggregate equilibrium quantities under a relative
rule as QR and under ordinary Cournot (which is the same as under a xed
rule) as QC : Then we can establish the following more general result.
Proposition 4 If the underlying Cournot oligopoly is regular then any in-
terior equilibrium outcome under a relative auditing rules satises QR > Q

C :
Proof. Fix the quantities of N   2 rms and investigate the location of
the best responses of the two remaining rms, say 1 and 2; under relative
auditing. Inequality (10) from the previous lemma tells us that for every
given quantity vector of the N   2 remaining rms
BRR1 (q2) > BR
C
1 (q2)
BRR2 (q1) > BR
C
2 (q1)
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hold. So the candidates q1 and q2 for mutual best responses given the others
quantities have to jointly satisfy:
q1 > BR
C
1 (q2)
and
q2 > BR
C
2 (q1):
As BRC2 (q1) is strictly monotonous in a regular oligopoly for interior equi-
librium we can invert the second condition and write:
q1 > BR
C
1 (q2) _ q1 > BR 12 (q2); or
q1 > maxfBRC1 (q2); BR 12 (q2)g
where BR 12 (q2) denotes the inverse best response function of rm 2. From
condition (8) for a regular Cournot game we can conclude that:
d
dq2
BRC1 (q2) >  1 8q2
d
dq2
BR 12 (q2) <  1 8q2
We have BRC1 (q

2) = BR
 1
2 (q

2), where q

2 is rm twos quantity in the equi-
librium of the reduced two-rm game for given quantities of the others.
Because the slopes are di¤erent this implies:
q1 >

BR 12 (q2) for q2 < q

2
BRC1 (q2) for q2  q2
Now given that the isoquant for aggregate output q1(q2) for the Cournot
equilibrium of the reduced game has slope 1 and satises q1(q2) = BRC1 (q2) =
BR 12 (q

2) we can conclude:
q1 > q1(q2) 8q2:
So the aggregate quantity of two rms under relative auditing is larger than
without for any given quantity of the others. As this is true for any two
rms and any given quantity of the other rms we can conclude that any
equilibrium output vector qR is such that Q

R > Q

C :
The result, illustrated in Figure 1, might seem surprising. After all, what
does a rm gain from extending its output beyond the Cournot level? By
increasing output in this way it would seem that a rm reduces its own gross
14
Figure 1: Cournot equilibrium under relative auditing
prot and the gross prots of the competitors; this would seem to be a loss
rather than a gain.
However, recall the role of the informational externality here. As qi
increases, the prots of other rms g i fall, so d

 i, the optimal declarations
of the other rms, fall. Therefore the probability of audit of rm i decreases;
which in turn gives rm i some more scope for evasion. By increasing output
beyond the Cournot quantity a rm intends to trade some gross prot for a
better environment for evasion. This externality can easily be identied by
the di¤erences in the rst-order conditions for the quantity choices under
the di¤erent rules. Comparing the rst-order conditions shows that the
externality under relative auditing is given by the term
nX
j 6=i
@ (i;d)
@dj
@dj
@qi
[i   i] ;
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which describes the inuence of rm is quantity on i0s expected payo¤
by the indirect e¤ect on the other rms declarations and hence rm is
audit probability. As the other rms will decrease their declaration if their
prot is decreased, which decreases rm is audit probability, rm i has an
incentive to sabotage the other rmsprots by producing more than under
the equilibrium of the underlying Cournot oligopoly.
So increasing output as described above reduces the impact of the ex-
ternality imposed by the authoritys relative audit rule. A lower gross prot
helps closing the gap of the net prots between the situation after an audit
() and the situation where no audit took place (). Since all rms have the
same incentives this does not really work for the rms, they all try to reduce
the impact of the externalities by increasing their quantities. So they are all
worse o¤ than if they just had produced the Cournot quantity on the rst
stage. The externalities imposed by the authority on the prot declaration
spill over into the output-decision stage.
6 Price decisions
Now consider the impact of relative auditing if rms compete in prices. Ob-
viously, a prot-tax enforcement in a deterministic world only makes sense
if rms make positive prots. Therefore we consider Bertrand oligopolies
with di¤erentiated products only. In what follows we concentrate on an
underlying smooth and (strictly) supermodular Bertrand oligopoly with dif-
ferentiated substitutes, which has a unique equilibrium in pure strategies.
A su¢ cient condition for uniqueness is that the best responses of the rms
(BR1(); :::; BRN ()) are a contraction, which is satised for a range of stand-
ard demand and cost systems (Vives 1999, p 150). We will refer to such a
price game as a regular Bertrand oligopoly with substitutes.
The second stage of the tax-evasion game is obviously not a¤ected by
changing the market structure and choice variable. Firms still maximize
their expected payo¤s by simultaneously choosing prot declarations given
the prots determined in the competition stage. The rst-order conditions
(4) for optimal declarations do not change. This implies that the rst di-
vidend of relative auditing  less evasion for a given auditing budget  is
also present under Bertrand competition. The more interesting question is
whether a relative audit rule enhances e¢ ciency under Bertrand competition
in the same way as it does under Cournot competition. Note that an audit
rule enhances e¢ ciency in price competition with di¤erentiated products
if it lowers equilibrium prices. Denote the best response of rm i to the
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prices of the competitors in the regular Bertrand game as BRBi (p i), while
BRRi (p i) gives the best response correspondence under a relative audit
rule.
Lemma 5 Assume that the market organisation has the form of a regular
Bertrand oligopoly. Then
BRRi (p i) < BR
B
i (p i)
wherever BRBi (p i) > 0
Proof. Take the rst-order condition for the price choices, which is (6)
with quantities are replaced by the prices:
nX
j 6=i
@ (i;d)
@dj
@dj
@pi
[i   i]| {z } +
@gi
@pi|{z}

1  t+ t (i;d) + [i   i]
@ (i;d)
@di

| {z } = 0
(a) (b) (c)
To prove our claim we have to show that this rst-order condition re-
quires @gi =@pi > 0: For this to hold we need (a) to be negative for pi > 0;
as (c) is always positive. As i   i < 0 and @ (i;d) =@dj > 0 for any
interior solution, the crucial question is whether @dj=@pi > 0 holds. Using
the implicit function theorem we can write rm js subgame perfect reaction
to rm i changing its price as:
@dj
@gj
@gj
@pi
=   1


C 00   (f + t) @
 (j;d)
@dj

@gj
@pi
where  is again given by (9). Given  < 0; C 00 > 0, @(j;d)=@di < 0; and
@gj=@pi > 0 this term is positive since. Consequently, we need @d

j=@pi > 0
for the rst-order condition to hold, which proves our claim that
BRRi (p i) < BR
B
i (p i) 8i;p i > 0 (11)
With this result in hand it is straightforward to show that a relative
audit rule leads to an equilibrium with lower prices for all rms in a regular
Bertrand oligopoly with di¤erentiated substitutes.
Proposition 6 If the underlying Bertrand oligopoly with di¤erentiated sub-
stitutes is regular then any interior equilibrium outcome under a relative
audit rule satises pRi < p
B
i 8i:
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Proof. Fix the prices of N   2 rms. According to the lemma above,
under relative auditing potential mutual best responses of the two remaining
rms 1; 2 have to satisfy:
p1 < BR
B
1 (p2):
and
p2 < BR
B
2 (p1):
where the xed prices of the other rms are omitted for simplicity of nota-
tion. We can invert the second part of the condition above as best responses
are strictly increasing for interior equilibria. The condition for a possible
mutual best response becomes:
p1 < maxfBRB1 (p2); BR 12 (p2)g:
As both BRB1 (p2) and BR
 1
2 (p2) are increasing in p2 with a xed point
(pB1 ; p
B
2 ); which is the Bertrand equilibrium in the reduced game of rms 1
and 2 for given prices of the other rms, we can conclude that pR1 < p
B
1 .
Using the same logic we can show that pR2 < p
B
2 : This result holds for any
two rms and any price vector of the other rms. Therefore we can conclude
that in equilibrium pRi < p
B
i 8i:
Figure 2 illustrates the logic of the proof above. Note that if the under-
lying Bertrand oligopoly is supermodular, but with multiple equilibria, then
there always exists an equilibrium under a relative auditing rule with prices
lower than the lowest equilibrium prices under a xed rule.11
7 A numerical example
In this section we present a simple numerical example in order to illustrate
the e¤ects of a relative audit rule. Suppose that the underlying market
structure is a symmetric Cournot duopoly with linear inverse demand (with
parameters a and b) and constant marginal cost c. Then the gross prot of
rm i is simply given by:
gi (qi; qj) =: qi (a  b (qi + qj)  c) :
As simple relative audit rule is
i(di; dj) =:
8<:
+ x(dj   di) if (  1)=x  dj  di  =x  dj
1 if di < (  1)=x
0 if di > =x  dj
11 If the game is still supermodular under a relative audit rule then introducing a relative
audit rule leads to the prices converging to an equilibrium with lower prices regardless of
the Bertrand equilibrium we start at. This follows from Vives (2005), result 5, p 450.
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Figure 2: Bertrand equilibrium under relative auditing
We can interpret  as the default probability, while x determines the re-
sponsiveness of the audit rule to unequal declarations. Furthermore, we
assume quadratic evasion costs with a scaling factor k:
C(di;
g
i ) :=
(gi   di)2
k
:
The tax and ne systems are linear with proportionality factors t and f:
Table 1 shows the impact of a relative audit rule for the parameter vector
(a = 10; b = 1; c = 1;  = :2; x = :2; k = 20; f = :4; t = :4).
In our example the relative audit rule slightly increases the surplus (by
1 percent), while the rst dividend the reduction in tax evasion is much
more pronounced. We conducted a wide range of simulations to get a feel for
the size of the di¤erent e¤ects. We found that the e¢ ciency gains are usually
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q1 + q2 p Surplus 
g
1;2 d1;2 evasion %
Relative rule 6.25 3.75 36.72 8.59 7.26 15.5
Fixed rule 6.00 4.00 36.00 9.00 6.6 26.67
Table 1: Impact of a relative rule
small compared to the reduction in evasion. However, a relative audit rule
that does the job of reducing tax evasion and additionally comes with a
second dividend a moderate increase in e¢ ciency is highly desirable. It
has to be noted though that a relative audit rule does not seem suitable as
a primary instrument to solve ine¢ ciency problems due to market power.
8 Conclusions
This paper has focused on a relatively neglected aspect of tax compliance.
It has shown that market structure matters in tax enforcement, a result
that is in sharp contrast to the neutrality results that are typical in the
literature. We have seen that, in standard models of industrial organisation,
the enforcement policy a¤ects rmsbehaviour in two dimensions  their
market behaviour as well as their compliance behaviour. Appropriate design
of the enforcement policy can thus have a double dividend.
The relative audit rule has an advantage over the independent rule and
even over a system without taxation if the e¢ ciency of outputs is concerned.
A relative audit rule creates externalities on the declaration of prots, which
spill over to the quantity or price decision. In the quantity-competition
model this audit rule leads to higher outputs than in a pure Cournot oligo-
poly. Because an audit regime which treats each rm independently does
not impose those externalities, under such a regime the quantity choice is
not inuenced by the tax-evasion decision and the Cournot quantities are
produced. Similar conclusions apply in a price-competition model.
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